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INTRODUCTION 
The Defendant, Jana Potter, submits the following Reply to the Dishingers' 
response to her assignments of error. Appellee requests the Dishingers' appeal be 
dismissed and this matter be remanded to award Potter the relief requested. Dishingers 
vacated the premises October 15, 1998. The existence of the lease and possession of the 
premises are not at issue in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Should Have Ruled As A Matter Of Law Or Instructed The 
Jury As A Matter Of Law That The "Then Prevailing Rental Rate" Was The 
Market Rate. 
1. The Dishingers response mischaracterizes Appellees' Brief. As stated 
earlier, "then prevailing rental rate" means market rate. It is a term of art and should 
have been interpreted by the trial court as a matter of law. Ebadon Realty v. Patterson, 
192 Misc. 50, 78 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1948). Jeffs v. Stubbs, 1970 P.2d (Utah, 1998). 
Dishingers' Reply Brief, at page 13, makes a statement that Potter's Brief supports the 
proposition that "prevailing rental rate" means the most frequent. This is inaccurate and 
her position has always been that it is synonymous with current, market rate. 
2. The Dishingers' Reply Brief does not challenge three, crucial elements, 
requiring this Court to reject their arguments: 
i. Prevailing rate is a term of art which is subject to interpretation by 
the Court as a matter of law; 
ii. By definition and case law, prevailing rate means market rate; and 
l 
iii. The market rate for this property at the time of the exercise of the 
option was at least $30.00 per square foot. 
3. The trial court should have entered judgment interpreting the lease pursuant 
to Potter's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 71-72), but refused. Subsequently, the 
Court should have interpreted the contract language as a matter of law and either ruled 
that the prevailing rental rate was $30.00 per square foot or, at a minimum, instructed the 
jury to determine what the fair market rate for the premises was at the time of the 
exercise of the option since the interpretation is a matter of law. Overson v. United States 
Fidelity and Guarantee Company, 587 P.2d 149 (Utah, 1978). 
B. Administrative And Late Fees Were Unequivocal Contract Terms Which 
Should Have Been Determined As A Matter Of Law. 
1. It is important to point out that whether or not the jury verdict was advisory 
as set forth by Potter or whether the trial court let some matters go to the jury (i.e. accord 
and satisfaction) and then rejected those findings as contrary to the law and entered a 
verdict in accordance with that ruling, the interpretation of the clear terms of the contract 
is a matter of law for the Court to determine. Overson v. United States Fidelity and 
Guarantee Company, 587 P.2d 149 (Utah, 1978). 
2. In the trial court's findings set forth in the Judgment (R. 416-418), the 
Court stated: 
Defendant submitted the claims for administrative fees and late fees 
to the jury. The jury clearly saw fit to decline an award to defendant for 
these claims. 
2 
In fact, in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Proposed Judgment filed 
January 27, 1998 (R. 385), Defendant submitted to the Court that the interpretation of 
these contract terms should not be submitted to the jury and was a legal issue to be 
decided by the Court. 
3. In construing language of a contract, this Court should not defer to the trial 
court if the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous. Gump and Ayers Real 
Estate v. Domcoy, 733 P.2d 128, 129 (Utah, 1987). It is inappropriate for the trial court 
to defer its responsibility to rule on matters of law by delegating that responsibility to a 
jury. This Court should disregard the trial court's judgment and remand this matter for 
determination as to the late fees and administrative costs properly chargeable to the 
Dishingers pursuant to the contract of the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant requests this Court to remand this proceeding to the trial court to award 
Potter administrative fees and late fees provided for by the lease. The matter should be 
further remanded to determine the then prevailing rental rate chargeable to Dishingers 
upon exercise of the option and award Defendant her attorney's fees. Dishingers' appeal 
should be dismissed. 
DATED this fO day of October, 2000. 
i„ %&*— 
ROBERT FELTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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